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SUMMARY
A recent outbreak of Q fever was linked to an intensive goat and sheep dairy farm in Victoria,
Australia, 2012-2014. Seventeen employees and one family member were conﬁrmed with Q fever
over a 28-month period, including two culture-positive cases. The outbreak investigation and
management involved a One Health approach with representation from human, animal,
environmental and public health. Seroprevalence in non-pregnant milking goats was 15% [95%
conﬁdence interval (CI) 7–27]; active infection was conﬁrmed by positive quantitative PCR on
several animal specimens. Genotyping of Coxiella burnetii DNA obtained from goat and human
specimens was identical by two typing methods. A number of farming practices probably
contributed to the outbreak, with similar precipitating factors to the Netherlands outbreak, 2007-
2012. Compared to workers in a high-efﬁciency particulate arrestance (HEPA) ﬁltered factory,
administrative staff in an unﬁltered adjoining ofﬁce and those regularly handling goats and kids
had 5·49 (95% CI 1·29–23·4) and 5·65 (95% CI 1·09–29·3) times the risk of infection,
respectively; suggesting factory workers were protected from windborne spread of organisms.
Reduction in the incidence of human cases was achieved through an intensive human vaccination
programme plus environmental and biosecurity interventions. Subsequent non-occupational
acquisition of Q fever in the spouse of an employee, indicates that infection remains endemic in
the goat herd, and remains a challenge to manage without source control.
Key words: Public health emerging infections, Q fever.
INTRODUCTION
Q fever, a zoonosis caused by the small intracellular
bacterium Coxiella burnetii, was ﬁrst recognized
clinically in 1935 [1]. Labelled ‘Query fever’ by
Derrick; Burnet [2] and Cox [3] then characterized
the causative agent, C. burnetii, which is endemic at
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varying prevalence on all continents except New
Zealand and Antarctica [4, 5].
C. burnetii has been isolated from a wide range of
mammals, birds and arthropods [6], including native
animals [7–11]. In Australia, human infection is usually
acquired from ruminants and is characterized by a non-
speciﬁc febrile illness in about 40% of those infected [4].
Pneumonia, hepatitis or more rarely haematological,
neurological or cardiovascular involvement can occur
[12]. Morbidity increases with inoculation dose [13],
and more cases are reported in males aged between
40 and 60 years [4, 12, 14]. A large outbreak in The
Netherlands, 2007-2012, was attributed to intensive
goat farming [14].
Within Australia, Q fever is known to be endemic in
livestock in Queensland and New South Wales
[15, 16]. These two states have some of the highest
rates of notiﬁed human Q fever in the world with
50-110 cases/100 000 population per year [17]. Victoria
has much lower rates (0·51 cases/100 000 for the last
10 years) than the national average (1·9 cases/100 000)
(National Notiﬁable Diseases Surveillance System,
Australian Government). Outbreaks in Australia are
generally occupationally related, involving abattoir or
rendering processes [18, 19], farmers [20], saleyards
[21] and veterinary clinics [22, 23]. In Queensland in
2003, ﬁve cases were linked to a goat farm [24].
The mainstay in the prevention and control of out-
breaks in Australia is vaccination of humans. The Q
fever vaccine, (Q-Vax®, CSL Ltd, Australia), has been
licensed since 1989 for use in adults. An Australian
government-funded national vaccination programme
for abattoir workers and farmers ran from 2001 to
2006; however, it did not target goat farmers [17].
Vaccine protection has not been evaluated in a rando-
mized clinical trial; however, retrospective cohort stud-
ies estimate efﬁcacy at >90% for those vaccinated 15
days prior to exposure [25]. Vaccination is strongly
recommended for all occupational groups exposed to
animals and their products [26].
We describe an outbreak that occurred on a
1450-ha commercial dairy goat and sheep farm in
Victoria. Dairy sheep operations commenced in 1991
and dairy goat operations in 1995. The farm houses
5000 goats, 3000 of which are milking at any one
time. The dairy sheep herd consists of ∼2500 animals
(∼800 milkers), managed separately at pasture on an
adjoining property. Processing of milk for retail pro-
ducts occurs in a high-efﬁciency particulate arrestance
(HEPA) ﬁltered factory. Goats are housed in open-
sided sheds with deep straw bedding rather than at
pasture; kidding occurs four times per year. The kids
are removed from their mothers soon after birth
(‘snatch reared’) and hand-fed to control for caprine
arthritis encephalitis virus transmission. The owner
reported that the number of abortions in the herd
began to substantially increase from 2004 (detailed
records not kept).
This paper describes the Q fever outbreak, the link
to intensive goat farming and the One Health manage-
ment approach.
METHODS
Epidemiological investigation
A Q fever outbreak investigation was launched by the
Victorian Department of Health (DoH) on 11
February 2013 after the laboratory notiﬁcation of
ﬁve cases employed at the same farm within the
week commencing 31 January 2013.
The DoH led the formation of a multi-disciplinary
team tasked with investigating and managing the
outbreak. This included members from the Victorian
Department of Environment and Primary Industries
(DEPI), The University of Melbourne (UoM), the
Victorian regulatory body for workplace occupa-
tional health and safety (WorkSafe), the Australian
Rickettsial Reference Laboratory (ARRL), St John
of God Pathcare Geelong (SJOG), the Geelong
Hospital Infectious Diseases Department (GH) and
local General Practitioners (GPs). Two combined
visits to the exposure site were undertaken for the
purposes of risk assessment by DoH, DEPI, UoM,
SJOG and ARRL, with a series of smaller focused
follow-up visits.
In Australia, Q fever is a notiﬁable disease in
humans but not animals [27, 28]. In Victoria, notiﬁca-
tion of human cases must be made in writing by clin-
icians and diagnostic laboratories. Public health
ofﬁcers follow-up all notiﬁcations, undertaking a
structured questionnaire-based interview with the
treating doctor and case. The aim is to identify the
source of acquisition, record clinical details and to in-
stigate appropriate public health interventions.
A conﬁrmed human case of Q fever requires either
deﬁnitive laboratory evidence (detection of C. burne-
tii by nucleic acid testing or by culture, seroconver-
sion or a signiﬁcant increase in antibody level to
Phase II antigen in paired sera tested in parallel in
the absence of recent Q fever vaccination); or a clin-
ically compatible syndrome accompanied by
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detection of IgM speciﬁc for Phase II C. burnetii in
the absence of recent Q fever vaccination [29]. A
probable human case was deﬁned as a person with
an epidemiological link to the outbreak and either
a clinically compatible illness or laboratory evidence
of recent infection [total Phase II indirect immu-
noﬂuorescence assay (IFA) 5200].
The index case was a 61-year-oldmale (case 11), who
presented to his GP on 21 January 2013 with fever,
headache, sweats and malaise. The GP noted his occu-
pation on a goat farm and the burial of goat carcasses
in the previousmonth. Q fever was conﬁrmed by a posi-
tive speciﬁc IgM enzyme immunoassay. Four of his
co-workers (cases 2, 3, 9, P1) with similar illnesses
subsequently requested testing (Table 1).
On11February 2013 the farmwasadvisedof a formal
outbreak investigation andwas instructed to institute ac-
tive workplace surveillance. Skin and serological screen-
ing was subsequently undertaken for employees on 19
February 2013 by a doctor attending the workplace.
DEPI launched a Signiﬁcant Disease Investigation,
including risk assessment, management recommenda-
tions and livestock testing.
Data on potential risk factors for all of the farm’s
employees during 2012-2014 were collated in Microsoft
Excel and analysed as a cohort study using Stata version
13.0 (Stata Corporation, USA). Descriptive analysis was
undertaken with frequency tables by case status and
calculation of crude attack rates (based on incident
conﬁrmed and probable outbreak cases), excluding
those employees with positive skin or serology tests at
screening. Those variables with univariable associations
(applying a liberal P< 0·20 cut-off) with case status were
entered into a multivariable generalized linear model
with robust standard errors according to Zou [30], and
retained if associated with case status at P< 0·05. Age
and sex were considered a prior as confounders and
forced into the ﬁnal model.
Livestock and environmental investigation
Goats fromthe largest herdwere sampled for serologyon
8 August 2013. This herd comprises about 1200 milking
animals. A single bleed of 65 goats, randomly selected
from two non-pregnant milking herds of about 400
goats, was undertaken to demonstrate the presence of
disease with 95% conﬁdence at a design prevalence of
5%, adjusting for ﬁnite population size [31].
During subsequent kidding seasons, samples were
obtained for quantitative polymerase chain reaction
(qPCR) testing including aborted placentas and
fetuses, vaginal swabs from associated does, and en-
vironmental samples (from bedding and air testing).
Laboratory investigation
Human samples were tested at ARRL. Serological
testing was performed using a nationally accredited
(National Association of Testing Authorities,
Australia) in-house IFA, in which a fourfold rise in
antibody titres between acute and convalescent sera,
or the presence of antibodies to Phase II IgM antigen
only was considered a positive result. Patients’ sera
were screened at dilutions of 1/25 and 1/400, the latter
to detect the prozone phenomenon. If positive the
antibody titre was determined by titration. Samples
were selected for qPCR from cases that were identiﬁed
as being part of the outbreak at illness onset; had suit-
able specimens available (acute serum or EDTA
blood); and were Phase II IgM negative on their initial
serology test [32]. DNA was extracted from the serum
or buffy coat fraction using a commercial kit (RBC
Bioscience, Taiwan). Assays targeting the C. burnetii
com1 gene and the heat shock operon htpAB (primers
htpAB_F: 5’-GTGGCTTCGCGTACATCAGA-3’ and
htpAB_R: 5’-CATGGGGTTCATTCCAGC A-3’, and
probe htpAB_P: 5’-FAM-AGCCAGTAC GGTCG
CTGTTGTGGT-BHQ1-3’), were performed [33], with
the result considered positive if both targets were
detected or a single target detected in duplicate reactions.
Isolation of C. burnetii was attempted from four of the
acute serum samples by inoculation of the serum into
a Vero cell culture, monitored for up to 12 weeks [34].
Goat specimens and environmental samples were
tested using the com1 qPCR based on collection and
extraction methods described previously [35, 36].
Culture was attempted from two of the highly positive
samples, with swabbed material resuspended in PBS
ﬁltered sequentially through a 0·45 µm and 0·22 µm
ﬁlter. The ﬁltrates were added to Vero cell monolayers
and cultures maintained as above.
Two genotyping methods based on single nucleo-
tide polymorphisms [37] and the insertion element
IS1111 [34] were applied to the isolates and a selection
of the PCR-positive samples.
The goat sera were tested at DEPI by the comple-
ment ﬁxation test (CFT) using C. burnetii Phase II
antigen (Siemens Healthcare Diagnostics, Germany).
Any sample with a CFT titre of 58 was retested
using C. burnetii and control antigen; inconclusive
results and non-speciﬁc reactors were eliminated
from further analyses.
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Table 1. Cases of acute Q fever during an outbreak of Q fever in Victoria, 2012–2014
Case no.
Symptom
onset date Sex
Age,
years
Laboratory
diagnosis
Total IFA
titre Ph2
Sought
care Hospitalized Treated Vaccinated Role on property
1 1 Mar. 2012 F 39 Speciﬁc IgM 3200 GP, ED Y Y N Electrician
2 20 Aug. 2012 M 60 Speciﬁc IgM >3200 N N N N Tradesperson
3 1 Sept. 2012 F 40 Speciﬁc IgM >3200 N N N N Administration
4 22 Sept. 2012 M 30 Speciﬁc IgM >3200 N N N N Milking, kidding
5 27 Sept. 2012 F 25 Speciﬁc IgM >3200 GP N N N Milking, kidding
6 7 Dec. 2012 M 40 Speciﬁc IgM >3200 N N N N Farm labourer
7 9 Dec. 2012 M 41 Speciﬁc IgM 200 N N N N Process manager#
8 10 Dec. 2012 F 48 Speciﬁc IgM >3200 GP N N N Administration
9 21 Dec. 2012 M 51 Speciﬁc IgM >3200 N N N N Mechanic
10 22 Dec. 2012 F 53 Speciﬁc IgM 1600 N N N N Administration
11 12 Jan. 2013 M 61 Speciﬁc IgM EIA positive GP|| N Y N Farm labourer
12 13 Jan. 2013 M 24 Speciﬁc IgM >3200 N N N N Pasteurization#
13 12 Sept. 2013 M 36 Culture† n.a. ED|| N Y N Milking
14 13 Sept. 2013 F 36 Seroconversion†‡ n.a. GP, ED|| Y Y N Milking, kidding
15 15 Oct. 2013 M 60 Seroconversion n.a. ED|| Y Y N Farm labourer
16 16 Oct. 2013 F 17 Rising titre‡ 800 N N N N Bottle-feeding kids
17 26 Oct. 2013 M 29 Culture† n.a. GP, ED|| Y Y 25 Oct. 2013 Carpenter
18* 4 July 2014 F 55 Seroconversion n.a. GP, ED|| Y Y N n.a.
Probable cases
P1 Asymptomatic M 22 Speciﬁc IgM 1600 N N N N Milking
P2 Asymptomatic F 48 Speciﬁc IgM >3200 N N N N Administration
P3 Asymptomatic F 33 Speciﬁc IgM 200 N N N N Milking
P4* Asymptomatic M 86 Speciﬁc IgM >3200 N N N N Milking, kidding
P5* Asymptomatic F 69 Speciﬁc IgM 800 N N N N Farm labourer
P6* 13 Sept. 2013 M 14 n.a.§ EIA negative ED|| N Y N Milking
IFA total phase 2 titre was designated not applicable (n.a.) when the diagnosis was conﬁrmed by culture or seroconversion, as the total titre response is not relevant for meet-
ing the case deﬁnition. ‘Sought care’ indicates sought care at time of illness via a General Practitioner (GP), Emergency Department (ED) or neither (N).
* Not an employee, see text.
† PCR undertaken, negative result.
‡Culture attempted, nil isolated.
§ Repeat serology not undertaken.
|| QF diagnosis made at time presented to healthcare.
# Tasted unpasteurized milk.
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Ethical standards
The authors assert that all procedures contributing to
this work comply with the ethical standards of the
relevant national and institutional guides on the care
and use of animals. All animal sampling was under-
taken under the Victorian Government Department
of Environment and Primary Industries’ signiﬁcant
disease investigation programme.
RESULTS
Epidemiological investigation
By 28 February 2013, 12 cases of acute Q fever had
been conﬁrmed with symptom onset between 1
March 2012 and 31 January 2013 (Table 1, Fig. 1).
A series of public health measures designed to curtail
the outbreak were implemented as described in ‘public
health actions’ (see Table 2). Despite these measures, a
further ﬁve workers were conﬁrmed with acute Q fever
during the September kidding season. Four of these
workers had not received their recommended vaccin-
ation, while the ﬁfth (case 17) became unwell the
day after vaccination. Case 17 improved when admi-
nistered doxycycline, and with case 13, was conﬁrmed
as an acute case after C. burnetii was cultured from
blood.
Nine months later (4 July 2014), a 55-year-old fe-
male (case 18) presented to her GP with symptoms
of headache, chills and signiﬁcant sweats. She was
subsequently hospitalized and Q fever conﬁrmed by
seroconversion. As the spouse of case 15, she was
not employed on the goat farm and had not been on
or near the property in 2014. She visited farmhouses
on other sheep properties in the district, but did not
have any direct animal contact. Fomite transmission
(washing her husband’s contaminated clothing) was
thought to be the most likely route of infection.
Sexual transmission is a possibility, but considered
less likely having been much less frequently described,
with no cases documented following antimicrobial
treatment of the index case [4, 38].
A total of 18 conﬁrmed cases were identiﬁed (10
males, 8 females), with a median age of 40 years
(interquartile range 30–53; Table 1). None of the
cases were appropriately vaccinated. Two cases were
involved in tasting unpasteurized goat’s milk, in add-
ition to other exposures. Nine of the 18 cases sought
healthcare at the time of their illness, of which four
cases were hospitalized with a severe inﬂuenza-like ill-
ness. These four cases were diagnosed with acute
hepatitis (alanine transaminase peak 3–15 times the
upper limit of normal reference range); two patients
also suffered moderate thrombocytopenia. No case
Fig. 1. Epidemic curve of conﬁrmed cases of Q fever linked to an outbreak associated with a goat and sheep dairy farm
in Victoria, 2012–2014. Light blue bars represent conﬁrmed cases, open bars are probable cases and the red arrow
indicates when the investigation was launched.
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required intensive care support. One case was hospita-
lized after acute illness for investigation of a chronic
fatigue-like syndrome. The remainder of the cases suf-
fered from either a mild or moderate inﬂuenza-like ill-
ness. One case became pregnant 5 months after her
untreated acute Q fever infection (case 3) and subse-
quently delivered a healthy infant at term. Overall,
only seven of the 18 cases received speciﬁc treatment
for Q fever (doxycyline).
In addition to the 18 conﬁrmed cases, there were six
probable cases, including ﬁve asymptomatic cases
with high Phase II titres and one clinically ill case
without conﬁrmatory serology (Table 1).
Eighteen further employees had low positive
screening results (IFA total antibody <200 or positive
skin test). Given they all lived and worked in a rural
area, it was not possible to conclude whether these
reﬂect individuals with asymptomatic infection or
exposure to C. burnetii separate to this outbreak
(see Supplementary Table S1 for further screening
results).
Of 100 farm employees, ﬁve had been vaccinated
prior to detection of the outbreak and six were
employed in marketing roles with no contact with
the affected farm; these were excluded from further
analyses (Fig. 2). The case status and details of the
remaining 89 employees are presented in Table 3.
Eighteen employees had positive screening results,
leaving a crude attack rate of 31% (22 conﬁrmed
and probable cases in 71 employees). The highest
Table 2. Public health actions
General biosecurity measures Case-ﬁnding and management
. Biosecurity hazard signage erected on all the public
access entrances to the property
. All fences and gates were to be maintained in good
working order with access gates locked if possible
. Vehicle wash stations and footbaths
. Hand wash or disinfection facilities
. Active surveillance and screening
. Diagnosis of Q fever discussed with the cases involved,
follow-up organized with an Infectious Diseases specialist
. Letters sent to GPs in the region recommending a heigh-
tened awareness, and index of suspicion, encouraging
testing and details on how to notify any suspected cases
. Chief Health Ofﬁcer Advisory release to medical practi-
tioners in the region, detailing the increased incidence of
Q fever
Employee and visitor risk reduction Environmental and animal management
. Vaccination strongly recommended for all employees
and visiting contractors, with documentation to be
sighted and recorded
. Coordinated screening and vaccination process for new
staff developed in conjunction with a local GP, with
records forwarded to the National Q Fever Registry
○ Vaccination required 15 days prior to visiting the
property
○ If this not possible then personal protective equip-
ment (PPE) to be utilized in the interim
. All visitors to the property required education on risk,
both oral and written
○ Regular visitors required to show evidence of vac-
cination, facilitated by the establishment of a visitor
registry
○ Irregular visitors provided with PPE
. Information and policy regarding Q fever incorporated
into occupational health and safety policies and proce-
dures for the business, including the orientation package
for new employees
. Manure should not be removed from the deep litter sheds
or yards for at least 1 month after the kidding season, then
should be composted or alternatively stored for 3 months
prior to spreading on farm land for fertilizer
. Manure required to be covered during storage and trans-
port and must be under-ploughed immediately when
spreading on farming land
. All abortive materials should be removed immediately and
safely disposed of by deep burial or composting
. Kids not allowed to be sold younger than 2 month of age,
and all prospective buyers of older goats must be notiﬁed
of the Q fever status of the farm
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attack rates were observed in administrative workers
in the ofﬁce adjacent to the main dairy shed (75% fe-
male, none vaccinated) and persons aged >40 years;
while the lowest rate was seen for those working in
the HEPA-ﬁltered factory. Adjusting for age and
sex, administrative workers and those regularly hand-
ling goats and kids had >5 times the risk of infection
of workers in the HEPA-ﬁltered factory (Table 4).
Livestock and environmental investigation
Nine of the 65 goats sampled had CFT antibody titres
for C. burnetii (apparent prevalence = 15%, 95% conﬁ-
dence interval 7–27); six had uninterpretable results.
Age could not be ascertained for one test-negative ani-
mal. qPCR results of samples from goat vaginal
swabs, placenta and aborted kids are presented in
Table 5. None of the air or bedding samples conclu-
sively tested positive.
A pure culture of C. burnetii was isolated from a
stillborn kid, and was genotyped along with the two
human isolates and eight of the strongly positive
qPCR samples. Identical single nucleotide poly-
morphism patterns were observed in all outbreak iso-
lates and samples, identifying a multispacer sequence
typing (MST) genotype that has been observed in
other Australian isolates but is novel compared to pre-
viously published data [34]. This novel MST genotype
is most closely related to genotypes MST1–MST7
observed in animal and human isolates from France,
Ukraine, Russia and Kyrgyzstan, and to MST30
observed in the Namibia strain isolated from an abort-
ing goat, but genetically distinct from the Netherlands
epidemic genotype MST33 [39]. Strains were also
identical by the IS1111 typing method.
Risk factors contributing to environmental contam-
ination included: high density of goats in close proxim-
ity (∼15 m) to ofﬁces; multiple kidding seasons per
year; dead animals buried in pits on site; straw and
Fig. 2. Relationship between cases, probable cases and employees screened for Q fever.
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Table 3. Risk factors for Q fever infection in employees of a goat dairy farm, Victoria, 2012–2014
Conﬁrmed cases
Variable (n) Non-cases Pre-screening Post-screening
Probable
cases
Screening
positives
Incident
cases* At risk† AR RR 95% CI
Job description‡
Administration (8) 3 3 0 1 1 4 7 0·57 7·43 1·68–32·9
Goat milker (17) 7 2 2 2 4 6 13 0·46 6·00 1·39–26·0
Farm labourer (16) 9 5 1 0 1 6 15 0·40 5·20 1·18–22·8
Goat and kid handling (7) 4 0 2 0 1 2 6 0·33 4·33 0·75–25·2
Factory worker (36) 24 2 0 0 10 2 26 0·08 1·00 —
Unknown (5)
Site of work‡
Ofﬁce (8) 3 3 0 1 1 4 7 0·57 5·14 1·47–18·0
Dairy and goat sheds (25) 12 2 4 2 5 8 20 0·40 3·60 1·08–12·0
Farm-wide (14) 8 4 1 0 1 5 13 0·38 3·46 0·96–12·4
Milk/cheese factory (37) 24 3 0 0 10 3 27 0·11 1·00 —
Unknown (5)
Sex
Male (42) 21 7 3 1 10 11 32 0·34 1·49 0·70–3·16
Female (47) 30 5 2 2 8 9 39 0·23 1·00 —
Age, years§
10–19 (9) 6 0 1 0 2 1 7 0·14 1·00 —
20–29 (22) 13 2 1 1 5 4 17 0·24 1·65 0·22–12·4
30–39 (18) 12 1 2 1 2 4 16 0·25 1·75 0·23–13·2
40–49 (18) 4 7 0 1 6 8 12 0·67 4·67 0·72–30·4
50–59 (13) 10 0 0 0 3 0 10 0·00 Undef. —
560 (5) 2 2 1 0 0 3 5 0·60 4·20 0·59–30·0
Unknown (4)
AR, Crude (unadjusted) attack rate; RR, unadjusted relative risks; CI, conﬁdence interval, estimated with univariable regression models.
* Conﬁrmed and probable cases only.
†At risk excludes those with positive screening results as it is unknown when they seroconverted.
‡Data missing for ﬁve employees
§ Data missing for four employees.
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manure from the sheds spread directly onto pasture
without composting [5]; failure to routinely wash or
disinfect vehicles travelling between farm sites; and
below average rainfall in the 6 months prior to the
index case (Australian Bureau of Meteorology).
Public health actions undertaken
Following the risk assessment, the outbreak team
developed a series of recommendations initially
targeting those at risk due to exposure to infectious
organisms on the property, and then extended to re-
duce exposure of persons in the region surrounding
the property (Table 2).
Farm management are implementing an education
campaign for family members, with optional vaccination
through local GPs. Uniforms are to be introduced, which
will bewashedand launderedon theproperty;workboots
will remain on site. There is a longer-termplan to develop
showering and changing facilities for staff.
Table 4. Final model of risk factors for Q fever infection in employees of a goat dairy farm, Victoria, 2012–2014
Variable Coeff. S.E. (Coeff.) Adjusted RR 95% CI
Job description
Administration 1·70 0·74 5·49 1·29–23·4
Goat milker 1·73 0·84 3·89 0·71–21·3
Farm labourer 1·36 0·87 4·01 0·70–22·9
Goat and kid handling 1·39 0·89 5·65 1·09–29·3
Factory worker 0·00 Ref. 1·00 —
Sex
Male 0·11 0·48 1·25 0·44–2·86
Female 0·00 Ref. 1·00 —
Age, years*
540 0·37 0·43 1·88 0·62–3·33
10–39 0·00 Ref. 1·00 —
n= 63; log-likelihood =−38·6473; DF = 7; Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) = 91·29.
Coeff., Coefﬁcient; S.E., standard error; RR, relative risks (adjusted for other variables in the model); CI, conﬁdence interval.
* Collapsed to binary variable for numerical reasons.
Table 5. Serological and quantitative polymerase chain reaction (qPCR) assay results from goat and environmental
samples collected during an outbreak of Q fever in Victoria, 2013–2014
Complement ﬁxation test titres
(IgM or IgG, C. burnetii Phase II speciﬁc) qPCR assay for C. burnetii
Age, years Cycle threshold (Ct)
Titre <2 2–4 55 Unknown Sample type
No. of
samples Positive <20 20–30 30–35 >35 Inconc. Negative
8 0 1 1 0 Goat vaginal
swab
15 4 2 1 1 − 11
16 3 2 0 0 Placenta 9 6 3 − 1 2 − 3
32 0 1 0 0 Aborted kids 22 18 3* 5 6 4 − 4
64 0 0 0 0 Live kid 2 − − − − − − 2
128 0 1 0 0 Air sample
(500 l)
3 − − − − − 1 2
Negative 28 17 4 1 Goat faeces 1 − − − − − − 1
Inconc. 3 3 0 0 Bedding 3 − − − − − 1 2
Apparent
prevalence
9·7% 22·7% 20·0% –
* One sample, Ct = 11·94, culture obtained from this specimen.
Inconc., Inconclusive results. For qPCR, only one target present or a single target present in only one of duplicate reactions.
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DISCUSSION
We describe the largest Q fever outbreak related
to farming in Australia, and the coordinated, multidis-
ciplinary approach to its management. Epidemiological
and molecular links established goats as the likely
source. High rates of infection were observed in unvac-
cinated workers in regular close contract with goats and
workers in the ofﬁce next to the main dairy. Lower
rates of infection in cheese factory workers suggests
they were protected by the HEPA-ﬁltered air, and
therefore that wind-borne spread of infectious organ-
isms may have signiﬁcantly contributed to acquisition
of infection in other worker groups. Animal and envir-
onmental investigations highlighted particular farming
practices that contributed to endemicity within the
goat herd and subsequent human exposure. Fomite
transmission appears to have occurred late in the
outbreak, indicating ongoing local environmental con-
tamination.
The origin of infection in the goats at the centre
of this outbreak has not been deﬁnitively established,
C. burnetii may have entered the herd in 2011 when
goats were introduced from interstate. This is an on-
going area of active research. Whereas C. burnetii in-
fection is endemic in livestock and wildlife in other
Australian states [7–11, 15], the prevalence of coxiello-
sis in livestock or wildlife in Victoria remains
unknown. Traditionally, infections in animals in
Victoria have been attributed to exposure to livestock
introduced from other states.
The goat farm at the centre of this outbreak utilizes
an intensive system for breeding and milking goats un-
common in Australia, but resembling that of goat
farms involved in the recent Netherlands outbreak
[40]. This system provides an ideal environment for
the multiplication, persistence and spread of C. burne-
tii infection in goats, with potential for infection of
farm workers and the sheep ﬂock. Contributing fac-
tors include: high stock density facilitating direct
animal-to-animal spread; housing on deep straw bed-
ding allowing build-up of a high level of infectious
organisms and use of discarded bedding as manure
for the paddocks thus introducing the bacteria to animals
at pasture. Multiple kidding seasons increases the fre-
quency of infectious shedding, environmental contamin-
ation and high-risk periods for transmission to humans.
It also repeatedly introduces large number of susceptible
young goats to the contaminated environment. Each of
these factors in concert may aid in the establishment
and maintenance of Q fever endemicity.
In common with the Netherlands outbreak [5, 14],
the early involvement of a multi-disciplinary team
allowed a comprehensive risk evaluation and con-
sensus control recommendations. Further research
needs were identiﬁed, including a review of the epi-
demiology of C. burnetii infections in humans in
Victoria, and validation of the IFA for use in estab-
lishing the prevalence in Australian livestock and
wildlife species.
There are marked similarities between the setting of
this and the Netherlands outbreak. Both occurred in a
region with previously low Q fever notiﬁcation rates
[14] in therefore highly susceptible human and live-
stock populations, and on farms with high goat dens-
ities [14]. Slow recognition of both outbreaks led to a
delay in instigating control measures [41].
Obvious differences include the vastly lower numbers
of human infections involved in theAustralian outbreak,
predominantly occupational acquisition of infection
and, as yet, no clear evidence of dissemination to sheep
and goat farms outside this enterprise. The considerably
lower humanand livestock populationdensity surround-
ing theAustraliangoat farmhas presumably contributed
to many of these differences. Epidemiological studies in
The Netherlands found the greatest infection risk for
community members was within 2 km, with minimal
risk beyond 5 km [42]. The closest small town to the
Australian farm is>10 kmawayandhas<1000 residents
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011 Census data).
Employees predominantly occupy farmhouses closest
to the property. There are no other intensive livestock
farms nearby, only those with more typical extensive
pasture-based farm systems. Due to the much smaller
scale of this outbreak and different risk proﬁle for sur-
rounding human populations, a number of control mea-
sures instigated in The Netherlands were considered but
not adopted in the control of this Australian outbreak
(Table 6).
Another clear difference is the availability of animal
vs. human vaccines. While human vaccination appears
to have been the most effective short-term interven-
tion, it has not addressed the challenging issue of in-
fection in the goats. Control at source has therefore
not been achieved. Human and livestock vaccination
have their own advantages and provide complemen-
tary infection control beneﬁts. The human vaccine is
of direct beneﬁt to those with inescapable occupation-
al exposure to infectious organisms or those with
background medical conditions that increase compli-
cation risk. However up-to-date vaccination of all
staff members has proven difﬁcult to maintain in
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this ﬂuctuating large workforce, and the ﬁnal case
highlights the risk in family members who are not
the target of the vaccination intervention. While the
livestock vaccine does not prevent infection [43], the
reduction in excretion of infectious particles from vac-
cinated animals (and therefore reduction in environ-
mental contamination) may signiﬁcantly contribute
to source control. For this reason, efforts were made
to import the inactivated Phase I livestock vaccine
(Coxevac®, CEVA Santé Animale, France). The im-
port application was rejected by the Department of
Agriculture due to biosecurity concerns, while cur-
rently the human vaccine Q-Vax (CSL Ltd) is prohibi-
tively expensive for application in livestock (CSL,
personal communication). The Netherlands Ministry
of Agriculture granted a special dispensation for use
of this same animal vaccine [44] and to import the
human vaccine from Australia for particular at-risk
groups [45]. Efforts are now underway to develop a
vaccine locally that may be administered to goats on
the farm as this is seen as the most feasible way of sus-
tainably reducing the risk of human infections in the
long term.
The key limitations of this study relate to the retro-
spective identiﬁcation of many of the cases. This,
combined with the non-speciﬁc clinical illness of Q
fever, may have led to underreporting of cases. It is
too early to comment on any of the long-term conse-
quences suffered by the cases due to their infection. It
also remains premature to conclude that the outbreak
has been completely controlled, hence on-farm active
human and animal surveillance continues.
CONCLUSIONS
Intensive goat farming is a growing industry in
Australia. Without the routine implementation of
Coxiella preventative measures, the risk of human Q
fever cases is likely to rise, despite clear lessons from
the Dutch outbreak. This outbreak highlights the sub-
stantial challenges of preventing human illness in a
setting where Q fever vaccination for animals is not
available, and provides further evidence as to the abil-
ity for C. burnetii to thrive on intensively managed
goat farms. In this Australian setting, human vaccin-
ation 15 days prior to exposure was instrumental in
preventing further cases of acute Q fever. We therefore
advocate for mandatory vaccination of all staff, in
addition to routine implementation of Coxiella pre-
ventative measures on such farms. This outbreak
Table 6. Features relating to this outbreak as compared to The Netherlands Q fever outbreak
This outbreak The Netherlands [12]
Occupational exposure Community exposure
Outbreak features
Cases
Low population prevalence prior to outbreak ✓ ✓
Delay in recognition of outbreak ✓ ✓
Spread of infection to other farms × ✓
Risk factors
Intensive goat farming ✓ ✓
Close proximity to densely populated areas × ✓
Windborne spread of disease ×* ✓
Public health management
Screening of population ✓ ×
Animal infections notiﬁable × ✓
Vaccination of humans ✓ ×†
Vaccination of animals ×‡ ✓
Manure and contaminated materials management ✓ ✓
Bulk milk testing × ✓
Restriction on breeding × ✓
Restriction on transport × ✓
Culling of animals × ✓
* Only locally to others on property.
†Recent use in high risk populations [40].
‡Application for importation permit rejected, further research ongoing to develop vaccine suitable for use in Australian
livestock.
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illustrates the infectious risk management complexities
in such an environment; the need to address the triad
of human–animal–environmental aspects; and the es-
sential requirement of a One Health approach in in-
vestigation and management.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
For supplementary material accompanying this paper
visit http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0950268815002368.
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